about all outcomes of care, including "unantici pated outcomes." It was a modest start. The stan dard did not specify the content of disclosure, nor did it mandate that patients be told when unan ticipated outcomes were due to error, partly out of concern that the standard not force admissions of liability. 27 Nonetheless, the Joint Commission's move was groundbreaking; it heralded a shift from mere endorsement of the importance of dis closure to a requirement with teeth because it was linked to the accreditation status of hospitals.
Health care organizations have responded to the Joint Commission's standard in varying ways. A 2002 survey of institutional risk managers showed that 36% of institutions had established disclosure policies 28 ; by 2005, this fraction had apparently increased to 69%. 29 These policies range from simple restatements of the Joint Com mission's standard to quite detailed disclosure procedures. 30, 31 There is little systematic evidence available regarding the impact of these new poli cies on the practice of disclosure.
Interest in disclosure is also growing outside the United States. In 2003, Australia launched its "Open Disclosure Standard," which is currently being tested in pilot programs across the coun try. 18 A similar disclosure initiative, "Being Open," was promulgated in the United Kingdom; it was accompanied by an ambitious educational cam paign. 19 Both programs strongly encourage trans parent communication with patients after unantic ipated outcomes, and they supply some impressive tools for helping clinicians achieve this goal. However, neither program addresses how disclo sure should proceed in circumstances in which the unanticipated outcome was caused by error, other than generally stressing the importance of not admitting liability. Compliance with these standards is not currently mandatory in either country, and to our knowledge, outcomes data have not yet been published.
Last year, disclosure efforts in the United States took important steps forward. In March 2006, the Full Disclosure Working Group of the Harvard Hospitals released a consensus state ment emphasizing the importance of disclosing, taking responsibility, apologizing, and discuss ing the prevention of recurrences. 30 In Novem ber 2006, the NQF endorsed a new safepractice guideline on the disclosure of serious unantici pated outcomes to patients. 13 NQF safe practices are evidencebased practices that, according to expert opinion and consensus among major qual ityofcare organizations such as the Joint Com mission, the Institute for Healthcare Improve ment, the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, and the Centers for Medicare and Med icaid Services, represent essential dimensions of highquality health care.
The new safe practice is poised to advance disclosure in important ways (Table 1) . First, it frames the disclosure of unanticipated outcomes to patients as a core component of highquality health care. Traditionally, communication with patients about unanticipated outcomes has been handled by risk managers who sought to mini mize malpractice claims and often operated in dependently of the institution's quality and safety leaders. By presenting disclosure as a patient safety challenge rather than a riskmanagement problem, the safe practice emphasizes that effec tive disclosure is a component of broad system improvement. It also encourages hospitals to in tegrate their riskmanagement, patientsafety, and quality programs.
Second, the safe practice recognizes that dis closures are uniquely challenging conversations and calls for appropriate staff preparation. Few clinicians have had training in disclosure, and even for those who have, disclosure conversations occur infrequently enough to make support nec essary at the critical moment. The safe practice describes a support system that provides train ing for health care workers and coaching just before a disclosure. Third, the safe practice out lines the basic content of the disclosure discus sion, which includes an expression of regret for unanticipated outcomes and an apology if error played a causal role. Fourth, it encourages the ap plication of performanceimprovement tools to the disclosure process, beginning with the track ing of disclosure outcomes.
The potency of the safepractice guidelines, like that of the Joint Commission's standard, stems from the presence of an underlying en forcement mechanism. The 29 large health care purchasing coalitions in the Leapfrog Group use the NQF safe practices as standards in their pay forperformance programs. 32 In addition, more than 1300 hospitals representing more than half of the nation's hospital beds currently submit in formation regarding their compliance with these safe practices to the Leapfrog Group, which then publishes the information on the Internet. Thus, performance scores for disclosure will soon be publicized alongside hospitalspecific scores re lated to each of the other safe practices. 33 This combination of direct financial incentives and visibility to consumers has the potential to cata lyze the development of relatively sophisticated disclosure programs.
Skeptics may question whether the NQF's en dorsement of disclosure will promote substantive change. Compliance with the safe practices is voluntary, and the submitted data are not exter nally validated. Moreover, many health care orga nizations do not participate in NQF or Leapfrog programs. Nonetheless, the NQF standard repre sents a sensible step forward, given the limited data on effective disclosure strategies. In particu lar, its link to the payforperformance movement may prove to be strategically important.
L eg a l De v el opmen t s
A flurry of laws concerning disclosure have been proposed or enacted at the state and federal levels. Most prominent nationally was the proposed Na tional Medical Error Disclosure and Compensation (MEDiC) Act of 2005, introduced by Senators Hill ary Rodham Clinton (DNY) and Barack Obama (DIL). 34 The bill was innovative in casting patient safety and the ills of the medical liability system as twin problems and then proposing enhance ment of the disclosure processes as a reform with the potential to address both. 15 The bill empha sized open disclosure of medical errors to patients, apology and early compensation, and a compre hensive analysis of the events. Congress did not pass the MEDiC Act, but its introduction indicates the rising profile of this issue, and similar legis lation is likely to appear.
State governments have pursued a greater range and volume of disclosurerelated legisla tion. Seven states -Nevada, Florida, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Oregon, Vermont, and California -have mandated that institutions disclose seri ous unanticipated outcomes to patients. Pennsyl vania's 2002 law was the first and arguably stands as the sternest. 35 It requires hospitals to notify patients in writing within 7 days after a "serious event." To counteract concerns about litigation exposure, the law includes a provision prohibiting the use of such communications as evidence of liability for the disclosed event. Interest in adopt ing this type of legal protection has been wide spread and is not limited to states with disclosure mandates. At least 34 states have adopted "apol ogy laws" that protect specific information con veyed in disclosures, most commonly apologies or other expressions of regret.
There are good reasons to be skeptical about the suitability of disclosure practices for regula tory oversight. With respect to disclosure man dates, enforcement is a formidable challenge. Without comprehensive adverseevent reporting systems and the substantial resources needed to audit charts and contact patients, it is extremely difficult for regulators to monitor the occurrence of disclosures, much less their quality. To our knowledge, none of the states that have enacted mandates have attempted serious enforcement, and only Pennsylvania actually specifies the sanc tions for noncompliance.
The content of disclosures is an especially elu sive target for regulation. Recent research sug gests that a key barrier to disclosure is the un certainty of health care workers regarding how much information to share with patients after ad verse events. 36 Disclosures are complex and subtle discussions and should be tailored to the nature of the event, the clinical context, and the patientprovider relationship; as such, they are not amena ble to "cookbook" rules specifying what informa tion to disclose.
In addition, there are holes in the protections that many apology laws provide. Approximately two thirds of the state apology laws protect only the expression of regret, not accompanying in formation related to causality ("our care caused your injury") or fault ("this should not have hap pened"). In addition, plaintiffs' attorneys, who must sift through dozens of prospective claims in choosing which ones to pursue, will prize in formation gained from disclosures, whether or not they are permitted to use that information as evidence in subsequent litigation. Thus, although apology laws are useful policy endorsements of disclosure, they will probably have little influence on disclosure behavior.
The potential for topdown regulation to have a meaningful effect on disclosure conversations is limited. The most successful disclosure initia tives are likely to be those that emerge locally, are driven by an institutional leadership and a work force committed to transparency, and focus on providing health care workers with the skills need ed to conduct these difficult conversations well.
There is considerable speculation and debate about the impact of disclosure on litigation. Patientsafety experts and proponents of disclo sure tout its litigationreducing potential and point to several success stories (which we review below) as well as research linking poor communi cation with patients' decisions to sue. 37-39 The ac tual effect is not known and will not be evident for years. Overall, disclosure probably will not have the chilling effect on litigation that some advocates have claimed. Although disclosure may quell some patients' interest in litigating, it will ignite interest in others, particularly those who would never have known of their injury in the ab sence of the disclosure. The net impact of disclo sure on the size and cost of litigation ultimate ly depends on the balance between these two effects. 40 
Prominen t Dis cl osur e Pro gr a ms
Although many organizations are experimenting with disclosure initiatives, relatively little is known about their effectiveness. In 1999, the Veterans Affairs Hospital in Lexington, Kentucky, issued the first published report of the effect of an open disclosure program. There were no dramatic changes in the volume of claims or the size of payouts after the hospital adopted the program. 14 Recently, the University of Michigan Health Sys tem reported that the cost and frequency of liti gation decreased substantially in the 5 years after the implementation of an opendisclosure pro gram, with annual litigation expenses reduced from $3 million to $1 million and the number of claims decreasing by more than 50%. 15 These two initiatives clearly spotlight institutions with a se rious commitment to transparency. The data are provocative but difficult to interpret because they rely largely on historical comparison groups and do not attempt to control for other factors that influence litigation rates and outcomes over time. In addition, the generalizability of the results at a single Veterans Affairs hospital and a single academic institution is questionable.
The bestknown privatesector disclosure pro gram is the "3Rs" program at COPIC, a liability insurer directed by physicians in Colorado. COPIC insures approximately 6000 physicians and is the largest insurer in Colorado. In 2000, the com pany developed a program designed to facilitate transparent communication about injuries and ex pedite compensation in selected circumstances. 41 The program's key features and outcomes are listed in Table 2 .
The 3Rs program links interventions to im prove communication with a mechanism that pro vides patients with up to $30,000 in compensa tion for outofpocket health care expenses and "loss of time." The program is "nofault" in that it does not tie compensation to evidence of fault on the provider's part. The payments are not made in response to written demands, and pa tients do not waive their rights to sue, so 3Rs payments are not considered reportable to the National Practitioner Data Bank.
The 3Rs program has handled more than 3000 events; approximately one quarter of the patients involved received payments averaging $5,400 each. Seven cases in which patients were paid proceed ed to litigation. Two cases resulted in addition al tort payments. Sixteen 3Rs cases that closed without payments were subsequently litigated; six of the patients secured tort compensation (Lem bitz A: personal communication). Although the range of cases handled by the COPIC program is limited, the outcomes suggest that these events can be resolved less adversarially than they might be by means of traditional litigation. In addition, the low average payment per incident reinforces the view that maximum compensation is frequent ly not the main objective for patients in the wake of medical injury. 42 Whether COPIC's outcomes can be general ized is also not known. Colorado has enacted broad tort reform that provides a fertile environ ment for the 3Rs program. COPIC has long fos tered a strong culture of patientsafety awareness and early incident reporting among its insured physicians; this culture also may have influenced the program's outcomes. The 3Rs program re quires close relationships among COPIC, the Colorado Board of Medical Examiners, and the Colorado Insurance Commissioner; these connec tions may be difficult to establish elsewhere. Whether initiatives like those in the 3Rs pro gram are feasible outside of Colorado will soon become evident as other insurers such as Medical Mutual in Maryland and West Virginia Mutual In surance Company embark on similar programs.
F u t ur e De v el opmen t s
Disclosure programs and practices are in their in fancy. The fast pace at which they have developed over the past 5 years appears to be set to continue and perhaps even accelerate during the next 5 years.
There will be ongoing experimentation with dis closure by health care delivery organizations and some malpractice insurers. This work will yield useful information about the impact of various disclosure approaches on key outcomes such as patient satisfaction and the rates and cost of liti gation. Insights gained by institutions that use standard qualityimprovement techniques to track, test, and refine their disclosure strategies will be especially valuable. Disclosure activities continue apace outside the United States. Canada's recently formed Canadian Patient Safety Institute, for ex ample, is set to release new national disclosure guidelines, and some Canadian provinces have adopted legislation concerning apology and dis closure. 43 To many practicing clinicians, the concept of disclosing harmful errors to patients will remain novel and raise concerns. Research is needed to better understand patients' preferences in relation to specific components of the disclosure discus sion. 19 Sophisticated investigations involving multi center controlled trials of training interventions are planned, but the results are several years away. Similarly, evidence of the medical and legal implications of disclosure will remain an open question for the foreseeable future. Although it may be disconcerting to individual practitioners, the absence of such an evidence base will proba bly not halt the widespread implementation of disclosure policies and procedures. The momen tum for change is now too great for any stake holder group to brush aside demands for trans parency.
As organizations gain experience with disclo sure, the challenges of conducting these conver sations and the need for provider education will be increasingly apparent. 44 Eventually, most orga nizations will probably provide introductory dis closure training for their health care workers and more intensive skills training with the use of techniques such as simulation for clinicians who are likely to be on the frontlines of the disclosure process. Many organizations will also train risk managers or medical directors to be coaches who provide guidance at the time that disclosure is warranted. Other organizations, troubled by the difficulty of disclosures and the risks associated with conducting them poorly, will move the in volved clinicians to the periphery and will rely on rapidresponse teams to conduct disclosures. It remains to be seen whether the benefits of the use of disclosure "pinch hitters" will outweigh the potential harm to the clinician-patient rela tionship.
Additional national organizations and special ty societies may follow the NQF's lead and dis seminate disclosure standards. Key uncertainties about disclosure practice include the effect of dis closure on patient satisfaction and claiming be havior and the role of apology and acceptance of responsibility in disclosure. Until research helps to resolve these uncertainties, most disclosure standards will remain advisory and general in nature. This paucity of evidence is also likely to prevent the Joint Commission from issuing more detailed disclosure standards and tying their ful fillment to accreditation. Although additional legislative activity is likely, most of it will be geared toward providing incentives for disclosure or penalizing failures to disclose, and the regu latory impact will be modest. In the short term, voluntary standards coupled with payforperfor mance-type incentives represent the best hope for making substantive improvements in disclo sure. Reactions to the NQF's new disclosure standard -in terms of payers' interest in it as a performance measure and how willing they are to use it in commercial decisions -will provide an early field test of this approach.
A transformation in how the medical profes sion communicates with patients about harmful medical errors has begun. Within a decade, full and frank disclosure of these events to patients is likely to be the norm rather than the exception. Making disclosure of harmful errors to patients an expectation in medicine and giving providers the tools to turn this principle into practice may prove to be critical steps in restoring the public's trust in the honesty and integrity of the health care system. Supported by grants from the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (1K08HS01401201) and the Greenwall Faculty Scholars in Bioethics Program -both to Dr. Gallagher.
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